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Abstract

This study was designed to detennine (a) whether children with
intellectual disabilities have a theory of mind deficit relative to younger
children of the same verbal mental age and (b) whether theory of mind in
children with intellectual disabilities is domain-specitic or related to other
general cognitive functions. A group of 15 children with intellectual
disabilities (mean age= 10;0), 15 children of average intelligence (mean age=
I0;0) and 15 children of average intelligence (mean age= 6:0) matched on
verbal mental age with the children with intellectual disabilities.
The children were given a series of theory of mind tasks. The children
with intellectual disabilities were significantly lower on theory of mind
performance !Tom the children of average intelligence of the same age, but not
!rom the younger children of average intelligence matched lor verbal mental
age. This indicates that the children with intellectual disabilities do not exhibit
a theory of mind deficit relative to other children of the same verbal mental
age. General cognitive functioning accounted for the ditTerence between the
groups and was significantly correlated with theory of mind perfonnance in the
group with intellectual disabilities.
It is concluded that children with intellectual disabilities do not have a

deficit in theory of mind relative to younger children of the same verbal mental
age, and that theory of mind in children with intellectual disabilities is not
domain-specific, but is related to verbal skills and general cognitive
functioning.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

Background
Children with intellectual disabilities arc those who have a low level of
intellectual functioning and poor adaptive skills (Beime-Smith. Patton, &
lttenbach, 1994). Both of these terms arc included in the detinition provided
by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR):

Mental retardation reters to substantial limitations in present
functioning. It is characterised by signiticantly subaverage
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related

limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive
skill areas: communication, selkare, home living, social skills,
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional
academics, leisure and work. (American Association on Mental

Retardation, 1992).

Australia primarily uses the AAMR definition in describing children
with inteliectual disabilities, with an emphasis on a clinical/medical model to

determine symptom seYerity. Categories are employed in terms oflQ range.
For example, children with an IQ score trom 55 - 75 are classified as having a
mild intellectual disability, children with an IQ score from 30- 55 are
classified as having a moderate intellectual disability. and children with an IQ
score below 30 are classified as having a severe intellectual disability (Drew,
Hardman & Logan. 1988 ). The present thesis is concerned with those in the
mild to moderate range of intellectual disabilities.
More males than females are diagnosed with an intellec\Ual disability.
Children with intellectual disabilities are also more likely to live in single

parent families and come from low socioeconomic status families (BeirneSmith, Patton, & lttenbach, 1994 ).
Estimates of the prevalence of intellectual disabilities vary !Tom 0.4% to
3% of the total population (McLaren & Bryson, 1987) and most of these fall
within the mild to moderate range, which is the group that is being targeted for
this study.
Children with mild to moderate intellectual disabilities often have
motivational and behavioural characteristics such as: a delay in developing
self-regulating behaviours, difficulty in establishing and maintaining
interpersonal relationships and social skill deficits (Beirne-Smith, Patton &
lttenbach, 1994 ).
Difficulty in establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships
and in social skills has been attributed to difficulties that children with
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intellectual disabilities experience in understanding other people's beliels and
desires (MitchelL 1997). If a child is unable to understand another"s beliefs or
desires, he or she may have ditllculty seeing things li·om the other person's
perspective. showing empathy with how the other person is feeling and seeing
the motives for another person's actions. All of these may lead to the child not
responding in an appropriate. socially accepted manner towards another

person, leading to possible conflicts or poor relationships with other children.
The growing child gradually gains an understanding of other peoples
desires, beliets and intentions. This allows him or her to interpret the
behaviour of others in a meaning!til way (Wellman. 1992). An understanding
ofbelietS and desires improves social interactions. For example, an

understanding of the actions ofbeliefand desire can be used in play situations.
Children may use their knowledge of beliefs and desires to allow them to
assign roles for play activities.
In other words, young children begin to develop a theory of how
people's minds work, which allows them to interpret others' actions in terms
oftheir beliefs and desires. This is called the child's "theory of mind". If a
child is delayed in developing such a theory of mind then he or she is unable to
attribute beliefs or desires to another person, making it very d itllcult for the
child to understand or predict the behaviour of that person.
Children with intellectual disabilities do exhibit some social difficulties.
Benson, Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio & Maas ( 1993) propose that it may be
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because these children have a poorly developed theory of mind. The present
thesis aims to explore this tl1rthcr.

Purpose
The purpose of the current study is to detcnninc whether children with

mild to moderate mtelleetual disabilities have a delk1t in theory of mind and to
examine some poss1hle reasons lOr this_ In order to investigate this, the
children m this study were given a set of tasks designed to test their theory of
mind The study is designed to explore and. if possible eliminate, alternative
reasons for any Jiffercnct.:s m theory of mind perf0rmance fOund between

children with intellectual disabilities and children of average intelligence.
One such reason is that children with imcllcctual disabilities do not

remember the details of the task as well as children of average intelligence.
Children who arc less able to remember the details of a scenario will perform
more poorly on tasks designed to test theory of mind. not necessarily because
they lack a theory of mind. hut simply because of their more limited memory.

Memory check questions arc used in this study to ensure that students arc able
to remember the appropriate scenarios. This is imponant as students with

intellectual disabilities have been found to exhibit deticits in memory
poriormance (Beirne-Smith. Patton & lttenbach. 1994 ).
Another possible reason for poorer perlbrmance of children with
intellectual disabilities on theory of mind tasks is that their level of general
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cognitive functioning is lower. Therefore, a measure of cognitive functioning
(Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices [RCPM], 1990) is used in the study to
determine whether or not theory of mind deticits could be attributed to general
deficits in cognitive ti.mctioning, as opposed to specific theory of mind deficits
(Baron-Cohen, 1991 ).
There tore this study is designed to examine not only whether children
with intellectual disabilities demonstrated deficits in theory of mind, but also
whether that deficit can be accounted tor by a more limited memory or by their
generally lower level of cognitive functioning.

Significance
It is important to study theory of mind because theory of mind is
considered to be of value in a wide variety of social situations. Mitchell
(1997) describes being aware of others' thoughts and feelings as being
necessary in order to be socially accepted by others. It also allows children to
avoid or defuse conflict situations with others by enabling children to see the
other's point of view and not only their O\'i:1. This has particular relevance for
those children with mild to moderate disabilities as they are integrated into
mainstream classes for their education.
Welch-Ross ( 1997) describes the importance of having an
understanding of others' minds in order to engage in everyday social
exchanges which contribute to the development of advanced cognitive
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processes. She argues that the "skills that are required to succeed on theory of
mind tasks may be necessary tor engaging in particular social interactions with
peers" (p. 626). These interactions incluJe such things as making joint
proposals for activities and for assigning roles during pretend play.
Mitchell ( 1997) states that "a conception of mind is also vital in
tbrming triendships" (p. 6). It enables children to distinguish those with whom
they should form lasting and trusting tfiendships. Those who have a similar
outlook on lite, with similar interests and desires. can be judged through
children's conception of mind.
This study is also signiticant in that it investigates theory of mind in a
population in which there is still little research. Most of the studies on theory
of mind have been conducted with autistic children. In these studies, learning
disabled or intellectually disabled children have been included only as control
groups (Frithe, Happe, & Siddons 1994; Happe, 1995; Charman & BaronCohen, 1992). Very few studies have examined children from other
populations. Those that have conducted ditlerent studies have studied
children with a hearing impairment. children with Down Syndrome, children
with intellectual disabilities and children of average intelligence (Zelazo,
Burack, Benedetto & Frye, 1996; Benson, Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio & Maas,
1993, Peterson & Siegal, 1995, Baron-Cohen, 1995).
This study is also significant because it wiii examine some ofthe
possible reasons that may account for children with intellectual disabilities
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having a poor theory of mind. The factors which will be examined, memory
and cognitive functioning, are known to be at a poorer level in children with
intellectual disabilities than children with average intelligence (Drew,
Hardman & Logan, 1988; Beirne-Smith, Patton & lttenbach, 1994). The
children with intellectual disabilities may find it more difficult to remember the
scenarios presented to them, which may in tum impair their ability to give
correct answers to theory of mind tasks. It is also known that children with
intellectual disabilities are often delayed in their general cognitive
development, and therefore a poorer theory of mind pertbrrnance between the
children with intellectual disabilities and children of the same age with average
intelligence may be explained by their overall poorer level of cognitive
functioning rather than a more specific deficit in theory in mind.
The evidence suggests that more research needs to be undertaken to
determine whether individuals with an intellectual disability show evidence of
theory of mind deficits and whether these deficits have some relation to other
areas of cognitive functioning. This research is also deemed to be important
from a social skills aspect, as having a theory of mind may be a key to some
deficiencies experienced in this area by children with intellectual disabilities.
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Definitions of Terms
Several key terms will be used a number of times in this thesis, and
therefore definitions of these terms are given below. These terms will be
discussed in greater detail in the literature review.

Beliefs

Beliefs are detined more broadly in the literature on theory of mind than
the general use of the term. Theory of mind proponents state that beliefs are
such things as knowing (having a true belief), guessing (having a belief that
may or may not be true), surmising (having a belief that may or may not be
true), doubting (having a beliefthat may be false) and being sure (having a
true belief). True beliefs are rooted in reality rather than fantasy. False beliefs

occur when a person has an inaccurate conviction about a situation (Wellman,
1992).

Desires
Desires are also defined in a broader manner in the theory of mind
literature than the generally accepted term. Desires are said to be such things
as wishes (a short term desire), preferences (a desire tbr a particular
item/situation), goals (a long term desire) and hopes (a desire tbr the future).
Because desires are not outwardly visible, they must be interred by the
observer.

8
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Intentions
An intentional action is one where a person decides on a course of

action deliberately. Both beliefs and desires are needed to provide
explanations for intentional actions. For example, if a person desires (wants) a
biscuit and they believe that a biscuit is located in a cookie jar, their intentional
act will be to go to the cookie jar to get a biscuit.

Specificity
The speciticity hypothesis refers to the claims made by some
researchers (Tager-Fiusberg, 1992 ~ Swettenham, 1996; Charman & BaronCohen, 1992; Leslie, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1991) that theory of mind is a
cognitive function in its own right, separate !rom other normally developing
cognitive functions, such as language, executive function, and memory.

Uniq11eness
The uniqueness hypothesis refers to the claim made by some
researchers (Happe,

1995~

Swettenham, 1996; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Ozonoff &

Miller, 1995; and Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992) that a theory of mind
deficit is only found in children with autism, and is not found in any other
population, not even in children with intellectual disabilities.

9
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Overview
The following chapter deals with relevant literature on theory of mind,
its development in normal children and its development in children with
disabilities. It also describes some of the possible reasons for theory of mind
deficits in children with intellectual disabilities, in particular, memory and
cognitive functioning and how these are to be assessed in this study. All ofthe
tasks that are used to assess theory of mind in children are described in detail
and the relevance ofthese tasks to theory of mind is discussed. The theoretical
framework that is adopted for this study is also presented, followed by the
research questions that were addressed tor this study.
The next chapter is the method chapter. This chapter describes the
participants of the study and their relevant characteristics. The procedure that
is to be used will also be detailed. Following the method chapter is the results
chapter. This chapter describes the results obtained from the study, whether
there were any differences between the groups on theory of mind performance
and whether or not these differences could be accounted for by memory and/or
general cognitive functioning.
Following the results chapter is the discussion chapter. This chapter
seeks to discuss the results in the context of other research, explain possible
reasons for the results obtained and discuss implications of the results for
future research and education of students with disabilities.
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Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter explains what theory of mind is, identilies relevant literature on
theory of mind and discusses some of the issues in the theory of mind area. It
also explains the normal development of theory of mind and its development in
individuals from other populations. Other factors which may account for a
theory of mind delicit in individuals are also explored.

Wit at is Tlleory• of Mind?

Theory of mind reters to "

the capacity to attribute mental states to

oneself and to others and to interpret behaviour in terms of mental states"
(Baron-Cohen, 1995, p. 55). For example, suppose there are two children,
Tommy and Keith. If Tommy goes to the biscuit tin which is kept in the
cupboard, Keith would be displaying a theory of mind if he assumed that
Tommy wants a biscuit and that his actions are explained by this unobservable
desire. This is an example of theory of mind because the actions of Tommy
arc being interpreted in terms of a mental state that cannot possibly be
observed. On the other hand, if Tommy went to the biscuit tin to look for a
biscuit, but Keith knew that the biscuits were still in the shopping basket and

II

had not yet been put away, Keith would display a theory of mind if he was
aware that Tommy held a false belief. Theory of mind is deemed to be a theory
because it allows people to predict another person's behaviour from an
unobservable source. A theory of mind is used in everyday social interactions
between people. It allows people to understand the desires and beliefs of
others.
The underpinnings of theory of mind begin with Flavell's work on the
perspective-taking abilities of young children as early as 1958. Investigators
such as Wellman, Premack and Woodruff, Bretherton and Beeghly and Leslie,
who published in the 1980s and 1990s, were concerned with the commonsense
understanding with which the mind brings order to the social events which
surround people (Flavell, Miller & Miller, 1993). This commonsense
understanding has been termed "tolk psychology".
More recently this work has become more restricted by theorists in a
theory-based approach which reters to a" ... more abstract, causalexplanatory system that allows the child to explain and predict behaviour by
referring to unobservable mental states such as beliefs and desires" (Flavell,
Miller & Miller, 1993, p. I01 ). Current theorists propose that children have
coherent concepts about the mind and behaviour and how the two are
interrelated. This is still a relatively new field of study and a great deal more is
still to be learnt about the development of a theory of mind, who does or does
not have a theory of mind, and the usefulness of having a theory of mind in
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today's society. The relevance of this subject to education is also still under
study, but there may be implications for the teaching of social skills to
children, particularly children with disabilities who have shown some deficits
or delays in this area.

Development of Theory of Mind in the Normal Population

There is evidence that children begin to develop a theory of mind from
3 or 4 years of age. This is a basic theory of mind, which, according to
Wellman ( 1992), develops in complexity as the child's development
progresses. Mitchell ( 1997) provides the evidence that theory of mind begins
at this age by explaining that children who cannot acknowledge a false belief,
Jack a theory of mind. He states that the children that cannot acknowledge a
false belief are unable to distinguish correctly between belief and reality and
therefore do not display the underlying "ognitive competence that is necessary
to distinguish another person's false belief Once a child is able to distinguish
between belief and reality he or she is able to understand false beliefs more
easily and begin to obtain a theory of mind.
Flavell, Miller and Miller ( 1993) state that the first thing a child needs
to obtain a theory of mind, is to have awareness that there is such a thing as a
mind and that humans think. An example that they give of this is when an
infant attempts to communicate with other people rather than with inanimate
objects. They state that infants do not infer mental states, but rather assume
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that the other person will respond to them. Although the infant has an
emerging awareness ofthe mind, he or she is not yet able to apply this
knowledge with any skill.
At around 2 or 3 years of age, the infant recognises that the mind has a

relationship with behaviour, objects and events. This is sometimes called a
perspective-taking ability. For example, the child may manipulate the
environment to hide an object so that another person cannot see it. The 2-yearold who i1as taken her baby brother's dummy may hide it behind her back
when her mother enters the room, so that her mother cannot see that she has
taken it. Here the child is able to difTerentiate between her own point of view
and the point of view of another person. This is considered to be an important
precursor to theory of mind abilities, and one which must be present before the
child can be said to have a theory of mind
The proposed beginning of theory of mind development at around 3 or
4 years of age, centres around the notion of a person's belief and the fact that
people can hold false beliefs. When children realise that a false belief can be
held by another person (or themselves), they are beginning to develop a theory
of how minds work (Mitchell, 1997). As an example of false beliefs, consider
the following scenario. Jennifer had some Jollies and put them in a box and
left the room. The Jollies were moved from the box to a cupboard, while
Jennifer was away. When Jennifer returned to the room she would look for the
Jollies in the box because she holds a false belief that the Jollies are where she
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left them. Children below the age of3, normally have difficulty with this
problem and state that Jennifer will look in the cupbcard because that is where
the Jollies really are. Children at this age tail to appreciate that Jennifer will
look for the loll ies in the last place that she saw them, rather than in their new
location, and that therefore Jennifer holds a false belief The understanding of
one person's false belief, which is acquired by children aged 3 or 4, is often
known as a tirst-order false belief (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
The final stage of theory of mind development centres around the
second-order talse belief tasks. In order to conduct a more difficult test of
false belief, Baron-Cohen ( 1995) devised a second-order talse belief task. This
task involves a person being able to understand nested beliets. That is the
person must understand one person's beliefs about another person's beliefs.
For example, "Anne thinks that Sally thinks ... ". Second-order false belief
tasks are able to be understood by normally developing 6-7 year olds. From
this age onwards, the theory of mind ofthe child grows in complexity and is
refined. Higher order beliets (ie third and fourth-order beliefs) are not
considered in this study as they are too advanced for the participants of the
study.

Development of a Theory of Mind in Other Populations
Much less research has been conducted on theory of mind development
in individuals from other populations than the normal population. Populations
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which have been studied include children with Down Syndrome, children with
a hearing impainment, children with intellectual disabilities and children with a
vision impairment. These studies however are very limited, as there are

generally only one or two studies which focus on each of these disabilities.
As there has not been much research on other populations there is little
evidence from these populations as to their theory of mind development.
Therefore there is debate as to the extent to which children with intellectual
disabilities, in particular, have a theory of mind deficit beyond what would be
expected given their general cognitive tunct10ning or intelligence. Theories
relevant to this debate and research evidence are discussed in the following
sections.

Uniqueness
Some theorists (Leslie, 1992) suggest that a theory of mind may never
or rarely be achieved by people in one population, specifically children with
autism. It is suggested that deficits in theory of mind perfonmance may be
attributed to a deficit in one area of social cognition. These theorists propose
that a deficit in theory of mind is unique to children with autism and that no
other population exhibits such deficits.
Another theory of development in other populations proposes that
children who have a developmental delay will also experience a delay in the
development of a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1991 ). This means that if a
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child is delayed in other areas of his or her development, such as a child with
intellectual disabilities, then it is likely that he or she will exhibit a delay in the
attainment of theory of mind as well. Such a child's theory of mind will be
slower to develop when compared with average children of the same mental
age.
A great deal of research (Happe, 1995; Swettenham, 1996; BaronCohen, 1995: Ozonoft' & Miller, 1995; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992).
suggests that theory of mind deficits, are unique to autistic children. This
means that the deficit found in autistic children is beyond what could
reasonably be assumed to be a developmental delay. This uniqueness
hypothesis has in turn led to the hypothesis that a theory of mind deficiency is
one of the underlying causes of the social difficulties faced by individuals with
autism. There is however a great deal of debate among researchers en this
issue, as some researchers (Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto & Frye, 1996, TagerFiusberg & Sullivan, 1994, Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991) state that
other populations may be affected in a social functioning manner by theory of
mind deficits, even ifthese are not as severe as those experienced by autistic
children.
The first half of Table I summarises the main studies that have reported
deficits in the theory of mind abilities of autistic children relative to various
control groups, and have concluded that theory of mind deficits are unique to
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Table I. ,'-J'tudies that examined the Uniqueness Hypothesis.
Author/s

Results

Groups
(Mean Age)

Studies Supporting Uniqueness Hypothesis

Swettenham
(1996)

8 Autistic ( 10:9)
8 Down Syndrome (II ;9)
8 Average (3:5)

Autistic group significantly poorer
than the other groups at theory of
mind transfer tasks.

Happe(l995)

70 Autistic (12:1)
34 Intellectually Disabled
( 12;3)
70 Average (4:0)

Significantly more average (58%)
and intellectuallv disabled (56%)
than autistic (20%) children
performed theory of mind tasks
correctly.

Channan, &
Baron-Cohen
( 1992)

17 Autistic(13:6)
141ntcllectually Disabled
( 14;5)
20 Average (4:4)

Average and intellectually disabled
children pt::rformed significantly
better on theory of mind tasks than
the autistic group.

Baron-Cohen
(1989)

I0 Autistic ( 15:3)
10 Down Syndrome ( 14:3)
10 Averaue (7;5)

Significantly more average (90%)
and Down Syndrome (60%) than
autistic (0°;0) children passed secondorder theory of mind tasks.

Studies Not Supporting [Jniqueness Hypothesis

Zelazo,
Burack,
Benedetto &
Frye, ( 1996)

12 Down Syndrome (22;7)
12Average(5;1)

Children with Down Syndrome
performed significantly poorer than
an average group matched on mental
age at theory of mind tasks.

TagerFlusberg &
Sullivan,
( 1994)

28 Autistic (16;11)
28 Intellectually Disabled
( 12;5)
18 Average (9: I)

No ditTerence found between the
autistic and intellectually disabled
groups on false belief tasks.

Benson,
16 Intellectually Disabled
( 17;5)
Abbeduto,
Short, Nuccio 16 Average (6;8)
& Maas
(1993)
Ozono!T,
23 Autistic ( 12; I)
Pennington & 20 Average (12;4)
Rogers, ( 1991)
18

Adolescents with intellectual
disabilities performed significantly
poorer than children of average
intelligence on theory of mind tasks.
Autistic group performed same as
average group on first-order theory
of mind tasks ..

the autistic group. The bottom half of Table I shows the main studies that
have found deficits in children from other populations and drawn conclusions
that children from other populations displayed theory of mind deficits and that
therefore theory of mind deficits are not unique to children with autism.
Swettenham ( 1996) used computer aids in his study to test and teach
theory of mind to a group of children with autism, a group with Down
Syndrome and a group of average intelligence. The participants for this study
were selected on the basis of having failed on three theory of mind tasks in an
initial assessment. Swettenham found that all of the students could pass theory
of mind tasks after instruction using the computers, but that the autistic
children could not pass distant transfer tasks (generalise their knowledge). He
suggests that the children with autism could have developed an alternative
strategy for passing the computer based theory of mind tasks, that they were
then unable to transfer to different situations.
Baron-Cohen ( 1989), Charman & Baron-Cohen ( 1992), and Happe
(1995) examined similar groups in their studies. All of the studies compared
three groups: children with autism, children with intellectual disabilities and
children of average intelligence. All three studies reported that the children
with autism performed at a much poorer level than either of the other two
groups.
On the other hand, Tager-Fiusberg & Sullivan (1994) and Ozonoff,
Pennington & Rogers (1991) included autistic students in their studies, and
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found no significant difference between their theory of mind performance and
that of children with intellectual disabilities and average control groups.
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers used participants who were close in age. They
used autistic students who were high functioning and therefore may have been
more socially adept than their lower functioning peers.
Zelazo et al. (1996) found that adults with Down Syndrome
performed more poorly on theory of mind tasks than 5-year-old children of
average intelligence matched on mental age. They conclude that" deficits in
theory of mind cannot invariably produce autistic behaviour, because people
with Down Syndrome present a distinctive behavioural and social profile" (p.
483). There is some concern, however, in regards to the severity of the
disabled group's disability and the ages of the participants in the study. It is
difficult to interpret a comparison between groups of such different ages.
Although they are matched for mental age, they must surely be widely different
in other ways. The theory of mind task is also not age appropriate tbr the 22year-old adults with Down Syndrome, although it is the kind of task that a 5year-old may be given in school. A number of other factors could also account
for the deficit, such as the strangeness of the task, unfamiliarity with a test
situation, language deficits and motivation. Using a closer mental age match
would at least reduce some ofthese effects.
One study dealt specifically with intellectual disabilities. Benson,
Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio, & Maas (1993) conducted a study using adolescents
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with intellectual disabilities and children of average intelligence. They used
16 adolescents with an intellectual disability and a mean chronological age of
17;5 and 16 children of average intelligence and a mean chronological age of
6;8. The participants were matched on non-verbal mental age. One first-order
and one second-order false belief story were used to test for theory of mind
performance. Benson et al. found that the adolescents with intellectual
disabilities performed worse than the students who were matched for mental
age, and that the children with intellectual disabilities performed better on
first-order, but not stcond-order tasks.
However, they also reported some limitations of the study. The
students were matched on non-verbal mental age. Benson, et al. (1993)
discussed that by not controlling for linguistic ability, they were not taking the
students' language abilities or lack thereof into account. They also used only
one first-order and one second-order task to draw their conclusions. They
noted that they should have used a greater number of similar tasks in order to
obtain an accurate representation of the students' performance on theory of
mind tasks.
In summary, although some authors have argued that a theory of
mind deficit is a characteristic unique to autistic children, others have
presented evidence that children with intellectual disabilities do not differ in
theory of mind perfonnance from autistic children, and are significantly poorer
than children of average intelligence matched on mental age. However, these
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studies have a number of limitations, including questionable mental age
matches and failure to account for verbal skills. Therefore, the question of
whether children with intellectual disabilities have a significant deficit in
theory of mind relative to the normal population still remains open.

Specificity

There is debate among researchers as to whether or not theory of mind
is a domain-specific function. Theory of mind may be regarded as domainspecific if a child can have normal or near normal functions in other domains
of cognition, such as executive control functions, memory and language
ability, but nevertheless exhibits deficits in theory of mind itself. Children
with intellectual disabilities already exhibit a developmental delay in cognitive
areas (Zigler & Hodapp, 1986), and it may be possible that a deficit in theory
of mind is attributable to this delay, rather than to a specific delay in theory of
mind itself.
A hypothesis has been made about the specificity of theory of mind
functions (Tager-Fiusberg, 1992; Swettenham, 1996; Charman & BaronCohen, 1992, Leslie, 1992 & Baron-Cohen, 1991 ). The specificity hypothesis
states that theory of mind functions are separate from normally developing
cognitive functions. This means that theory of mind develops in an individual
manner, rather than developing alongside other more general cognitive
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functions. Conversely theory of mind may not develop where other cognitive
functions develop at a nonnal rate.
Table 2 summarises the main studies that have examined cognitive
ti.mctioning in relation to the theory of mind abilities of children of various
populations. Some of the studies have found that general cognitive
functioning is not a factor in the theory of mind abilities of the children
examined, while others found that general cognitive functioning is a factor.
The studies that have found general cognitive functioning to be a significant
!actor in the theory of mind abilities ofthe children examined concluded that
the specificity hypothesis could not be supported, while those that found
general cognitive functioning not to be a factor, determined that theory of mind
was a domain-specific function.

Swettenham (I 996), in a study described earlier, found that although
the children with autism were able to pass the set theory of mind tasks after the
teaching session, they were not able to generalise these skills to different
scenarios, whereas the other groups could. The fact that the children with
autism were not able to generalise the knowledge they had been taught,
suggests a specific deficit in this area. The fact that they were able to devise
alternative strategies to pass the tasks suggests that the theory of mind function
is separate to other normally developing cognitive functions.
Leslie (1992) conducted a study involving autistic children, children
with Down Syndrome and children of average intelligence. He used a false
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Table 2. Studies that examined the Specificity Hypothesis.
Author

Group

Result

(Mean Age)
Studies supporting the specificity hypothesis

Swettenham
(1996)

8 Autistic (10;9)
8 Down Syndrome
(11;9)

Autistic childretl were impaired in generalising
theory of mind perfonnance, but not in other
functions relative to the other groups.

8 Average (3;5)
Charman&
Baron-Cohen,
( 1992)

17 Autistic (13;6)
14 Intellectually
Disabled (14;5)
20 Average (4;4)

Autistic children were able to understand false
non-mental representations, but were unable to
understand false mental representations.

Leslie, (1992)

Autistic (13;8)
Down Syndrome
(12;6)
Average (4;0)

The children with autism performed at a lower
level on theory of mind tasks, but at an average
level on other cognitive tasks.

Baron-Cohen,
(1989)

10 Autistic (15;3)
10 Down
Syndrome (14;3)
10 Average (7;5)

Autistic children not impaired in ability to
recObJTiise simple relationships, animateinanimate distinctions and simple reciprocity,
but impaired in theory of mind perfonnance.

Studies not supporting the specificity hypothesis

Zelazo, Burack,
Benedetto & Frye,
(1996)

12 Down
Syndrome (22;7)
!2Average(5;1)

A significant relationship between theory of
mind task petfonnance and alternative task
(card sorting) found for the Down Syndrome
b1f0Up.

Sparrevohn &
Howie, (1995)

15 Autistic-low
achieving (9;0)
15 Autistic-high
achieving (11;4)

A pattern of perfonnance indicated a
developmental sequence in theory of mind
tasks, rather than a pervasive and continuing
deficit.

Peterson & Siegal, 26 Deaf(I0;7)
(1995)

Deaf children's difficulty on theory of mind
tasks is possibly attributed to their difficulty
with language, not a specific deficit in this area

Klin, Volkmar &
Sparrow, (1992)

Other social deficits besides theory of mind
found in children with autism. Therefore theory
of mind cannot be a SEecific cognitive function.

29 Autistic (4;3)
29 lntellectually
Disabled! 4;0)
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belief task to assess the children's theory of mind, and a picture sequencing
task to compare the children's ability to understand mental and physical
events. The children with autism demonstrated poor results on the false belief
task and mental state stories, relative to the children with Down syndrome and
the children of average intelligence.
Baron-Cohen (1989) and Charman and Baron-Cohen (I 992) conducted
similar studies involving children with autism, children with intellectual
disabilities and children of average intelligence. In their studies they included
tests of cognitive function. These tests consisted of using non-mental false
representations, tests for understanding of reciprocity and tests for
understanding of animate-inanimate objects. Both of these studies found that
children with autism were impaired in their theory of mind while having other
cognitive functions such as recall of previous states, and person pennanence
intact This finding led to these researchers to conclude that the theory of
mind attainment is a specific cognitive domain, independent of other cognitive

domains.
On the other hand, there is also evidence that theory of mind is not in
itself a specific domain, but that deficits on theory of mind tasks are closely
related to deficits in other areas of cognitive functior 1g
Zelazo et al. (1996) found a significant relationship between theory of
mind and non-social rule use, as measured by a card sorting task, in children
with Down Syndrome. This means that the students who perfonned poorly on
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the theory of mind tasks also performed poorly on the card sorting task. They
postulated that "difficulties in theory of mind may depend on more general
difficulties in flexible reasoning, such as the ability to use a higher order rule"
(p. 479)

Peterson and Siegal (1995) conducted a study with 26 children with
hearing impairments aged 8 to 13 years of age. Peterson and Siegal discuss
the reasons for the deaf children's difficulty as possibly being attributed to
their difficulty with language. They also state that the neurological
explanation given (specificity hypothesis) in the case of autism is unlikely to be
the same reason for the deaf children's difficulty on these tasks. They
conclude that a better explanation is needed to explain the similar difficulty in
theory of mind tasks observed in deaf children.
Sparrevohn and Howie ( 1995) tested two groups of autistic children on
theory of mind tasks in order to ascertain ifthere was a developmental
progression of any sort. They tested high functioning autistic students and low
functioning autistic students to determine ifthere was a difference in theory of
mind task performance between the groups, and if this could be explained by
overall functioning of the individual. Their results showed that there was a
hierarchical pattern of performance across the tasks, suggesting a
developmental sequence oftheory of mind ability, rather than a specific deficit
in this area, and that the development is extremely slow in children with
autism. There was also evidence to suggest that verbal ability of the children
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contributed to their succe"; on theory of mind tasks. These findings are
inconsistent with the hypothesis that theory of mind functions are specific to a
cognitive domain.
Klin, Volkmar and Sparrow ( 1992) studied a group of children with
autism and a group of children with intellectual disabilities. These groups
were matched for mental age. Klin et al. used the Vineland Adaptive
Behaviour Scales to assess the social competence and social behaviours
displayed by both of these groups. Their results indicated that social deficits in
children with autism are pervasive and primary (occur early in the
developmental sequence) and are not limited to deficits in theory of mind
performance. The autistic children performed well on some areas of the
Vineland test such as motor skills, but poorly on verbal ability. The children
with intellectual disabilities performed as expected, given their lower level of
general cognitive functioning, on the social, motor and verbal skills tested by
the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales. These findings do not support the
specificity hypothesis made in regards to theory of mind detlcits, as the auti>tic
group performed poorly in a number of areas.
The authors ofthe studies have reported that the children displayed
deficits in theory of mind task performance and also displayed deficits in other
areas of cognitive functions. Because the children have demonstrated a deticit
in another area of cognitive functioning which is of the same severity as the
deficit in the theory of mind area, the researchers have concluded that theory
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of mind functions are directly related to cognitive functions in all other areas
as well. This means that a child will most likely have a deficit in theory of
mind if he or she has a deficit in general cognitive functioning. From this
finding, Zelazo et al., Benedetto and Frye, Sparrevohn and Howie, Klin,
Volkmar and Sparrow, and Peterson and Siegal, have stated that the
specificity hypothesis made by some researchers is unable to be supported by
their studies.
There is evidence both for and against the specificity hypothesis in
theory of mind. Therefore it is unclear whether or not theory of mind is or is
not a specific cognitive domain. Previous studies have attempted to control for
general cognitive functioning. The current study will also attempt to provide
evidence either tbr or against the specificity hypothesis by using a measure of
cognitive functioning which has not as yet been used by other researchers, as
well as controlling for verbal ability by using a verbal mental age matching
test.

Testing Tlreory of Mind
The tasks undertaken for this study are similar to those used to test for
children's theory of mind in a number of other studies (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Hobson, 1993, Zelazo et al. 1996; Frith, Happe & Siddons, 1994; Happe,
1995).
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Baron-Cohen ( 1995) describes one example of a first-order theory of
mind task as one in which the child must think about another person's false
belief on viewing a Smarties packet which is shown to contain pencils.
Children demonstrate a theory of mind if they can state that another person
would be deceived by the packaging of a Smarties packet ifthat person was
not shown what the real contents were (in this case, pencils). This is a theory
of mind task because the child must utilise what he or she knows about the
other person's beliefs (even if they are false) to predict the other person's
behaviour. This is only one example of a first-order false belief task.
Hobson ( 1993) describes another first-order theory of mind task, but
with a more complex verbal story line. It is known as the Sally-Anne task.
There are two characters, Sally who hides a marble and Anne who is out of the
room at the time. The questions to the child are tocused on Anne's beliefs
about the whereabouts ofthe marble. From the age of 3 or 4 years, children
state that Anne will look for the marble where she last saw it, because they
understand that Anne did not see Sally hide it and therefore that Anne must
have a false belief about the marble's location. Before this age, children state
that Anne will look for the marble in its correct location, because they do not
take into account her lack of knowledge about the whereabouts ofthe marble
and consequent false belief.
Sparrevohn and Howie (1995) describe a second-order theory of mind
task as one in which a child must determine how two people will think. For
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example, "Anne thinks that Sally thinks ... ". Therefore if a child shows an
ability to take into account the beliefs or desires of two people, then that child
is demonstrating an understanding of second-order false belief.
In order to be able to perform theory of mind tasks, it is necessary tbr
the child to be able to see something from another's perspective. If the child is
unable to see something from another's perspective, then he or she would not
reasonably be able to pertbrm theory of mind tasks because they demand
perspective-taking ability. A perspective-taking task has been described in
Donaldson ( 1978). This task deals with the" ... child not appreciate(ing) that
what he sees is relative to his own position; he takes it to represent absolute
truth or reality ... "(Donaldson, 1978, p. 20). The Policeman Task
(Donaldson, 1978, p. 21) involves a naughty boy hiding from a policeman
behind four walls. Props are used to demonstrate this to the child. A
simplified version of this perspective-taking task could be used to determine if
the child has the pre-requisite ability to succeed on theory of mind tasks.
However this has not been taken into account in any of the previous theory of
mind studies. If the child is unable to pass this task, it can reasonably be
assumed that he or she will have difficulty on the more challenging theory of
mind tasks.
In the present study, both children with intellectual disabilities and
children of average intelligence of the same age are given theory of mind tasks
to ensure that the theory of mind tasks used in the study are able to detect
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developmental differences. A difference is expected to be found between the
children of average intelligence matched for chronological age and the
children with intellectual disabilities.

Memory and Tlteory of Mind
Norman ( 1982) states that "to remember is to have managed three
things successfully: the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of information".
This has implications for students who have intellectual disabilities. Students
with intellectual disabilities have been found to have more limited memory
than children without intellectual disabilities. The greater the intellectual
deficit, the greater the memory deficit (Drew, Hardman & Logan, 1988).
These deficits have been attributed to several factors, relating to all of
Norman's requirements for memory. These include an inability to focus on
relevant stimuli, inefficient rehearsal strategies, and an inability to benefit from
incidental learning cues (Drew, Hardman & Logan, 1988).
A number of studies have investigated memory and its relation to
theory of mind. Benson, Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio and Maas (1993) conducted
a study with 16 children with intellectual disabilities and 16 children of
average intelligence, using both first and second-order scenarios. Benson, et
al. were able to determine whether or not the students were able to follow the
scenarios by asking content questions throughout the testing. They found that
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" ... the poor perfonnance of the (children with intellectual disabilities) was
not due to their inability to follow the critical events of the stories" (p. 430).
Charman and Baron-Cohen ( 1992) studied 17 children with autism
(mean age 13;6). 14 children with intellectual disabilities (mean age 14;5) and
20 children of average ability (mean age 5; I). They used a false belief test
with the children. They also asked questions to determine whether the
students understood the task and could remember past e·<ents. Charman and
Baron-Cohen found that memory was not a factor in the results that they
obtained, as the children had no difticulty remembering the tasks and the
questions put to them by the researchers.
On the other hand, Welch-Ross ( 1997) conducted a study 40 children
who ranged in age from 3 years. 6 months to 4 years. 6 months. These
children were required to discuss three past events with their mother, and
complete a set of theory of mind tasks. Welch-Ross found that the children's
theory of mind scores were related positively to their memory responses,
independent of their age and linguistic ability.
As children with intellectual disabilities may have poorer memory
functions than children of average intelligence, it is important to include
memory check questions in any study of their theory of mind to determine
whether memory is a significant factor in theory of mind performance.
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Theoretical Framework
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not individuals
with an intellectual disability perform more poorly on theory of mind tasks
than age-matched children of average intelligence and verbal age-matched
younger children of average intelligence. The study also investigates whether
deficits in memory or in cognitive functioning can account for any deficits in
theory of mind performance.
The research was conducted within the framework of the uniqueness
and specificity hypotheses.
The uniqueness hypothesis was tested as follows. If theory of mind in
children with intellectual disabilities develops at the same rate as their
intellectual development, then their performance on theory of mind tasks
should be comparable to the theory of mind performance of children of a
younger chronological age matched on verbal mental age (Baron-Cohen,
1995). This is shown on the right hand side of Figure I. However, if children
with intellectual disabilities perform significantly more poorly on theory of
mind tasks than younger children of the same verbal mental age, then this
would provide evidence of a deficit in theory of mind in children with
intellectual disabilities, similar to that already reported in children with autism.
It would suggest that children with autism are not unique in showing a deficit
in theory of mind, relative to their cognitive level, but that children with
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intellectual disabilities show the same pattern. This is shown on the left hand
side of Figure I.

Perfonnance on Theory of mind tasks

J

Significant Difft::rence
between lD and MA
groups on theory of mind
tasks

No Significant Difference
between lD and MA
groups on theory of mind
tasks

l:nore
o group
perfonn no
poorly than

lD group perform more

poorly than predicted on
the basis of verbal mental
age

predicted on the basis of
verbal mental age

·Inconsistent with the
Uniqueness Hypothesis

Note: ID

group~

Consistent with the
Uniqueness Hypothesis

children with intellectual disabilities.

MA group - children of average intelligence matched on verbal mental age.

Figure I. Possible results ofthe present study in terms of the uniqueness

hypothesis.
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The specificity hypothesis refers to the hypothesis that theory of mind
functions are domain-specific and therefore separate from other normally
developing cognitive functions. In the present study, this will be tested as
follows. If a difference is found between the children with intellectual
disabilities and the children of average intelligence matched for verbal mental
age, then it will be necessary to determine whether the difference is due to
theory of mind deficits or to general cognitive functioning. To do this a test of
general cognitive functioning will be used as a covariate (see Figure 2). If
there is still a significant difference after the covariate has been applied, then
the results can be said to be consistent with the specificity hypothesis
mentioned previously because this difference could not be accounted for by a
generally poor level of cognitive functioning. (See the left side of Figure 2.).
However, ifthere is no longer any significant difference found between the
children with intellectual disabilities and the children of average intelligence
when general cognitive functioning is used as a covariate, the results are
inconsistent with the specificity hypothesis because any difference that was
originally found can be accounted for by a generally lower level of cognitive
functioning. (see the right side of Figure 2).
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Ifthere is a Significant difference between
the ID and MA groups

Performance on theory of mind tasks with
performance on cognitive function task used
as a covariate

Significant Difference
between the 1D and MA
groups

No Significant Difference
between the ID and MA
groups

Cognitive functioning
does not account for the
difference between the ID
and MA groups

Cognitive functioning
does account for the
difference between the ID
and MA groups

Consistent with
Specificity Hypothesis

Inconsistent with
Specificity Hypothesis

Note: ID group - children with intellectual disabilities.
MA group - children of average intelligence matched on verbal mental age.

Figure 2. Possible results ofthe present study in tenns of specificity

hypothesis.
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Research Questions
The research questions that will be addressed in this study are as
follows:

(l) Do children with intellectual disabilities perform more poorly than (a)
chronological age-matched children and (b) verbal mental age-matched
children, on theory of mind tasks?

(2) If there are differences between the children with intellectual disabilities
and either of the other groups in theory of mind, can these differences be
accounted for by cognitive functioning as measured by Ravens Coloured
Progressive Matrices?

(3) If there are differences between the children with intellectual disabilities
and either of the other groups in theory of mind, can these differences be
accounted for by differences in the children's memory for the details of the
task?

37

I

Chapter Ill

METHODOLOGY

Participants

The participants for this study were 45 children drawn from three
populations. These populations were: children with intellectual disabilities
who were drawn from Education Support Centres (ES group), children of
average intellectual ability matched on chronological age with the children
with intellectual disabilities (CA group) and children of average intellectual
ability, matched on verbal skills with the children with intellectual disabilities
(MA group). There were 15 children in each group.
As shown in Table 3, the ages ofthe ES and CA groups were about 10
years of age but, whereas the ES group had a mean Peabody Standard Score of
61, the CA group had a mean Peabody Standard Score of 97, which is about
average. The MA group, though only about 6 years of age, obtained the same
level of raw score on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test as the ES group.
The children with intellectual disabilities were drawn from five
Education Support Centres and Units in the Perth Metropolitan area. The
children in the other two groups were drawn from five state primary schools on
the same sites as the Education Support Centres and Units. All of the schools
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used for this study were located in areas which can be described as middle
socio-economic status areas.

Table 3.
Characteristics of Children Participating in the Study.

Group

ES

N

group
15

CA
group
15

MA
group
15

Sex
M:F

11:4

11:4

11:4

Age
Mean (SD)
Range

10;0 (0;4)
9'6, 10·7
,

10;0 (0;4)
9;7- I 0;9,

6;0 (0;4)
5'6-6·5
,
,

Verbal Mental
Age

5·8
,

9·8
,

6·1
,

Peabody Raw
Score
Mean (SD)

72 (15)

I 04 (8)

69 (I 0)

Peabody Standard 61 (14)
Score
Mean (SD)

97 (10)

99(13)

29.7 (2.3)

16.5 (3.6)

Ravens Raw
Score
Mean (SD)

17.3 (5.3)
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Research Design
The independent variable for this study was group (ES group, CA group
and MA group). The dependent variables were the children's level of
perfonnance on four theory of mind tasks. Cognitive function was used as a
covariate.

Tests and Materials
Tests
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (PPVT-R) (Dunn &
Dunn, 1981) was used as an indicator of children's general verbal ability. The
PPVT-R tests "receptive vocabulary" and gives a "quick estimate of one major
aspect of verbal ability for subjects who have grown up in a standard Englishspeaking environment" (Dunn & Dunn, 1981, p. 2). The test does not require
reading or speech. In tenns of validity, the PPVT-R correlates (a) most highly
with other measures of vocabulary, (b) moderately well with other tests of
scholastic aptitude, and (c) reasonably with school achievement measured
concurrently and less well predictively (Dunn & Dunn, I 981, pp. 67-68). The
PPVT-R takes only I 0 minutes to administer, compared with the Weschler
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) which take well over an hour to
administer to each child. The PPVT-R is a quick and reliable way of
estimating verbal mental age. It was, therefore, considered to be an
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appropriate test on which to match children of average ability with older
children with an intellectual disability.
Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) (Raven, Court &
Raven, 1990), was used to assess the children's nonverbal cognitive ability.
The RCPM tests "the ability to form creative new insights or the ability to form
high level, largely nonverbal, constructs which make it easy to think about
complex issues" (Raven, Court & Raven, 1990, p. 33). Studies have related
performance on the Coloured Progressive Matrices to Piagetian classification,
spatial and reasoning abilities and simultaneous processing (Raven, Court &
Raven, I990, p. 33). The RCPM has correlations of .6 to .7 with intelligence
tests designed to be culturally fair. This test was used in this study as a
measure of cognitive functioning.

Materials

The following materials were required for the perspective and theory of
mind tasks:
• two soft toys (a bear and an elephant)
• four blocks of different colours (blue, red, yellow, green)
• a large smarties tube
• three dolls
• a basket

• a box
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• a bucket
• a marble

Procedure
The tasks were given to the children on an individual basis in a quiet
room. Each child was withdrawn from regular classroom activities for one
session of approximately 25 minutes. Each child was first given the PPVT-R
and the RCPM. Each of these tests was administered according to the
standard procedure outlined in each of the test manuals.
The children were then given a perspective task, and three theory of
Mind (ToM) tasks. (See Appendices B toE for the complete scripts used to
administer these tasks.)
The perspective and theory of mind tasks were tape recorded. These
tasks were administered as follows:

Perspective Task
This task has been modified from the "Policeman Task" described by
Donaldson ( 1978). Each child was shown two soft toys and four blocks of
various colours. The toys were arranged opposite each other and two blocks
were placed in front of each toy. The child was asked ifthe teddy could see all
of the blocks and if the elephant could see all of the blocks. A screen was
placed in the middle of the toys, as shown in Figure 3, leaving two blocks and
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one toy on either side of the screen. The child was then asked the following
eight questions:

I. Can the teddy see the blue block?
2. Can the teddy see the red block?
3. Can the teddy see the yellow block?
4. Can the teddy see the green block?
5. Can the elephant see the blue block?
6. Can the elephant see the red block?
7. Can the elephant see the yellow block?
8. Can the elephant see the green block?

D • •

EJ

•

0

~

Elephant

Figure 3.

Arrangement of materials for the Perspective-taking Task.
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Smarties False Belief Task_ (Baron-Cohen, 1995).

Each child was shown a Smarties container and asked, "What do you
think is in here?". The child was then shown that the tube actually contained
pencils. The experimenter then closed the tube and asked the child two firstorder false belief questions. These were: "When I first showed you this tube
what did you think was in here?" and "If (name of classmate) comes in who
hasn't seen inside the tube, what will he/she think is inside here?" A memory
check question was also asked: "What is really in the tube?"

Sally-Anne False Belief Task_ (Hobson, 1993 ).

In this task, two dolls, Sally and Anne were introduced. As shown in
Figure 4, there was a basket in front of Sally and a box in front of Anne. The
child was shown Sally placing a marble into her basket. Sally was then moved
out of sight (see Figure 4, steps I and 2). Then the child was shown Anne
transferring the marble from Sally's basket into her box, where it was hidden
from view by a lid being placed on the box (see Figure 4, step 3). As shown in
Figure 4, step 4, the experimenter then brought Sally back into view and asked
the child the first order false belief question: "Where will Sally look for her
marble?"
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Figure4.
Sequence of events in the Sally-Anne Task (Taken from Baron-Cohen, 1995,
p. 70).
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Two extra que>tions were used to test the child's memory of the events
and language used: "Where is the marble really?" and "Where was the marble
at the beginning?"

Sally-Anne-Ben Task (Second order false belie!)
In this modified version of the Sally Anne test, three dolls were used.
The first doll, Sally, had a basket in front of her, the second doll, Anne, had a
box in front of her, and the third doll, Ben, had a bucket in front of him. The
child was shown Sally placing the marble into her basket and moved out of
sight (see Figure 5, steps 1 and 2). The child was then shown Anne moving
the marble from Sally's basket and placing it into her box (Figure 5, steps 3
and 4). Anne was then moved out of sight. The child was then shown Ben
moving the marble from Anne's box and placing it into the bucket where it
was hidden from view by a lid covering the bucket (Figure 5, step 5).
The experimenter then brought Sally back into view and the child was
asked one first-order false belief question: "Where will Sally look for her
marble?" (Figure 5, step 6). Then Anne was brought back into view and the
second first-order false belief question "Where will Anne look for the
marble?" was asked (Figure 5, step 7). The child was then asked the secondorder false belief question: "Where does Anne think that Sally would look for
the marble?" (Figure 5, step 8) The memory questions asked for this task
were: "Where did Sally put the marble?" and" Where did Anne put the
marble?"
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Ethical Considerations

Parents of participants in this study were assured that all personal
information would be kept confidential. Identification numbers and not names
were used on all forms. Parental and school approval was obtained before any
testing occurred (see Appendix A for consent form). Testing was carried out
by the researcher with no-one else present. All taped and written information
was kept in a safe and secure location with access available only to the
experimenter. All data will be destroyed after 5 years. The children responded
positively to all of the tasks used in this study.
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Chapter IV
RESULTS

This chapter deals with the results of the study. First there is a section
on the scoring of the data and how this was done. This is followed by a report
of the differences found between the groups on theory of mind performance
and an analysis of the particular theory of mind tasks on which a difference
was found. How general cognitive function and memory are related to theory
of mind performance will then be examined, followed by a conclusion to draw
all of the results together.
The statistical computer package, SPSS for Windows, Version 6.1, was
used for all analyses in this study. An alpha level of .05 was set for all
analyses in the study.

Scoring
The first task given to the children was the perspective-taking task.
This task was included to establish basic perspective-taking ability, which is a
prerequisite for the theory otmind tasks in the study. This task was completed
by all children with 100% accuracy. Therefore the results of this task will not
be included in the remaining data analysis
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The responses to the second task, the Smarties Task, in which each
child was required to answer two first order false belief questions, were
assigned a score of I if they got both questions correct and a score ofO if they
did not. The third task asked the children only one first order false belief
question and was assigned. a score of 1 ifthe answer was correct and a score of

0 if it was not. The fourth task required the children to answer two first order
questions and a second order false belief question. Each of these questions
were scored as I if the answer was correct and 0 if it was not.
In order to analyse the data for this study, first of all, the scores on all of
the theory of mind tasks were summed for each child (see Table 4). This
method of scoring and analysis has been used by previous researchers
(Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Sparrevohn & Howie, 1994; Happe, 1995).

Difference in Theory ofMind Performance
The differences among the groups on the theory of mind tasks were
determined by examining the average total score for each of the groups (see
Figure 6). When all of the scores for the theory of mind tasks were totalled,
the MA group obtained a mean score of3.6 (SD = 1.2), the ES group obtained
a mean score of2.8 (SD = 1.7) and theCA group obtained a mean score of 4.6
(SD = 0.6), out of a possible 5.
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Table 4. Obtaining the total theory ofmind score.
Task

Order of

Question

Possible

Question
2

First

Score
"When I first showed you this tube what did
you think was in here?''
"If (name of classmate) comes in who hasn't
seen inside the tube, what will he/she think is
inside here?''

3

First

"Where will Sally look for her marble?"

4

First

"Where will Sally look for her marble?"

4

First

"Where will Anne look for the marble?"

4

Second

"Where would Anne think that Sally would
look for the marble?"
Total

5
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•
Mean Score on Theory
of Mind

Tasks

1

•+-------------~----------~

MAGroup

ESGroup

CAGroup

Figure 6. Total theory of mind scores for each group.

An ANOVA was conducted in order to detennine whether there were
any significant differences among the three groups. The results ofthe
ANOVA indicated that there was a significant difference, F(2, 42) = 7.36, p

=

.002. Tukey's HSD tests were then applied to the data to determine where the
difference lay. The only significant difference between the groups was
between the ES group and theCA group, (p = .00 I). The difference between
the MA group and the ES group was not significant (p = .22), and the
difference between the MA group and theCA group was not significant (p =
.10). The effect size for the ANOVA was .26. This means that 26% of the
variance in the children's theory of mind scores can be accounted for by group.
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In summary, overall on the theory of mind tasks, children with
intellectual disabilities were not significantly poorer in perfonmance than the
MA group but functioned at a significantly lower level than theCA group.

Theory ofMind Tasks on whic/1 a Difference was Found
Given the overall difference between the ES group and theCA group,
the separate tasks were analysed to detenmine on which of them a difference in
perfonmance between the groups occurred. Figure 7 shows the percentage
correct that each group obtained for each of the five false belief questions.
The ES group demonstrate lowest perfonmance across all of the tasks, followed
by the MA group and then the CA group.
100
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10
0
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Task3FO
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Note: FO = first order raise belief
SO= 811Cond orderfalse belklf

Figure 7. Perfonnance of each group on each task.
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Task4SO

A chi square analysis was conducted on each of the tasks separately to
determine if there were any differences between tasks. The results of these
analyses are presented in Table 5.
Using the chi square analyses, a significant difference was found
between groups for task 4 first-order false belief questions I and 2. Both of
these tasks required an answer that was of the first order, in preparation for the
more difficult second order questions. There were no significant differences
between groups for any of the other tasks.

Table 5. Chi Square Analysis of Group Differences for each Task.
Task

Order of Question

x'

p

2

first order

3.84

.14

3

first order

3.34

.19

4

first order

8.90

.01

4

first order

9.51

.01

4

second order

5.04

.08
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In summary, the children with intellectual disabilities performed more
poorly on task 4 first order questions, but the difference on the second order
false belief task did not reach significance.

Cognitive Functioning
A general low 'eve! of cognitive functioning is a possible reason that
may account for the poorer performance of children with intellectual
disabilities on theory of mind tasks. The scores from the Raven's Coloured
Progressive Matrices [RCPM] (Raven, Court & Raven, 1990) were used as a
covariate to determine whether general cognitive functioning could account
for the results.
When the effects of cognitive functioning were statistically controlled
using an ANCOVA, there was no significant difference between the groups on
theory of mind score, F(2, 44) = 3.04, p = .06. The effect size for the
ANCOV A was .13. This means that when cognitive functioning is taken into
account 13% of the variance in the children's theory of mind scores can be
accounted for by group.
A correlation between RCPM and the children's total theory of mind
scores revealed a significant relationship for the overall sample, r (43) = 0.61,
p < 0.001. However, when correlation coefficients were calculated for each

group separately, the relationship between the RCPM and the children's total
theory of mind scores was significant only for the ES group, r (13) = 0. 76, p =
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0.001, and not for theCA group, r (13) = 0.29,p = 0.29, or for the MA group,
r

(! 3) = 0.08, p = 0. 77. This difference could be due to the restricted range of

RCPM scores in theCA group (27- 34) compared with the wider range of
scores in the ES group (9- 27). However, restriction ofr~nge does not
account for the low correlation in the MA group(! 1 - 23). Figure 8 shows the
relationship between RCPM scores and total theory of mind scores for each
group.
In summary, because there was no significant difference between the
groups when cognitive functioning was taken into account, the ES group's
poorer performance on theory of mind tasks in general may be said to be
accounted for by their generally lower level of cognitive functioning.
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Memory Performance
Another factor that may account for the difference on theory of mind
performance between the ES group and CA group is their difference in
memory. In order to control for this, questions were asked throughout all of
the tasks in regard to recall offactual information. These questions were
related to the recall of single events that occurred throughout the tasks.
All of the children achieved I00% accuracy on the memory questions.
Memory therefore could not account for any differences in the children's
performance on theory of mind tasks.

Conclusion
The results obtained from the data show that there was a significant
difference between the ES and CA groups on theory of mind performance, but
no significant difference between the ES and MA groups. A lower level of
cognitive functioning in the ES group accounted for the difference between
the ES and CA groups on theory of mind performance, indicating a delay in
general cognitive functioning, rather than a deficit in theory of mind. Memory
could not account for differences in theory of mind performance.
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ChapterV
DISCUSSION

The main aim of this study was to investigate whether or not a
difference was evident between the three groups, children with intellectual
disabilities (ES group), children of average intelligence of the same age as the
children with intellectual disabilities (CA group) and children of average
intelligence matched for verbal mental age (MA group), when tested for theory
of mind task performance and whether this difference could be accounted for
by memory difficulties and/or general cognitive functioning. The following
chapter discusses the results which were obtained for this study and the
significance and application of the findings.

Evidence Regarding tile Uniqueness Hypothesis
The first research question of this study dealt with determining whether
the ES group performed more poorly than the CA group and the MA group on
theory of mind tasks. !fa significant difference was found between the ES and
MA groups on theory of mind performance, the results would be inconsistent
with the uniqueness hypothesis which relates to theory of mind deficits being
found only in children with autism and not in children with intellectual
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disabilities. If there was not a significant difference between the ES group and
MA group on theory of mind performance, the results would be consistent with
the uniqueness hypothesis in that the children with intellectual disabilities
show no evidence of a deficit like that of autistic children. As the ES group
already display an intellectual disability, a significant difference between the
CA and ES group was expected.
As expected, a significant difference was found between the ES group
and the CA group on theory of mind perfonnance. The difference found in
this study is one which would be expected, being between the children with
and without intellectual disabilities of the same age. The ES group would
obviously perform more poorly than the children of average intelligence of the
same age as they already display a developmental delay relative to this group.
However, no significant difference was found between the ES group
and the MA group. The failure to find a difference between the ES and MA
groups is consistent with results found in several other studies (Happe, 1995;
Charman & Baron-Cohen, !992; Baron-Cohen, !989). These researchers have
argued that children with intellectual disabilities do not display a deficit in
theory of mind, such as that found in children with autism. This study failed to
find a deficit in theory of mind for ES group and therefore is consistent with
this argument. The ES group in this study did not exhibit any deficit in theory
of mind performance that would not have otherwise been expected, given their
developmental delay.
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Happe ( 1995) found that 41% of children with intellectual disabilities
tested failed similar theory of mind tasks to those used in the current study.
This percentage is comparable to the 44% of children matched on mental age
who also failed the tasks in her study. In the present study, 44% of children
with intellectual disabilities failed similar false belieftasks but only 28% of the
MA group failed false belief tasks. Like the present study, Happe attempted to
match the children with intellectual disabilities to a group of children of
average intelligence matched on verbal mental age. However, her subject
characteristics state that the children with intellectual disabilities had a verbal
mental age of6;2 whereas the younger children of average intelligence had a
verbal mental age of only 4;3 --a difference of nearly two years. In the present
study the mental age match was much closer, with the ES group having a
verbal mental age of 5;8 and the MA group having a verbal mental age of 6; I.
This may account tbr the higher proportion of MA matched children in the
present study who succeeded in the theory of mind tasks.
Charman and Baron-Cohen ( 1992) also found that children with
intellectual disabilities did not differ in their performance on theory of mind
tasks when compared to 4-year-old children matched on mental age. The tasks
used to test for theory of mind performance were similar to those used in the
present study.
Another study that used a similar method to the present study was
conducted by Baron-Cohen ( 1989). He found that 90% of children with
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average intel': gence matched for mental age and 60% of children with Down
Syndrome passed false belief tasks. These are similar results to those found in
the present study which indicated that 72% of children of average intelligence
matched for mental age, and 56% of children with intellectual disabilities
passed theory of mind tasks. Baron-Cohen argues that the proportion of
children with Down Syndrome who passed the false belieftheory of mind
tasks is not a low enough figure to say that a deficit in theory of mind exists.
Only one study has found a deficit in theory of mind in children with
intellectual disabilities. Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto and Frye ( 1996) found
evidence that theory of mind deficits are demonstrated by children with
intellectual disabilities relative to mental age matched children of average
intelligence. Compared to the present study, however,Zelazo et al. used adults
with severe intellectual disabilities who varied widely in chronological age
from their 5-year-old mental age matched group. This is a possible reason for
the differences found in theory of mind performance.
The present study is inconsistent with previous research in failing to
find evidence that children with mild to moderate intellectual disabilities show
a deficit in theory of mind relati-re to children of average intelligence matched
for mental age.
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Evidence Regarding the Specificity Hypothesis

The second research question deals with whether or not general
cognitive functioning can account tor any differences in theory of mind
perfonnance. When cognitive functioning was taken into account, by using
scores from the Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court &
Raven, 1990) as a covariate, no differences were found between the groups.
This is consistent with the results of Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto and Frye
(1996) and Klin, Volkmar and Sparrow ( 1992). Both of these studies
investigated children with intellectual disabilities.
Zelazo et al. (1996) matched 22-year-old adults with Down Syndrome
and 5-year-old children of average intelligence on mental age. They found that
the difference in perfonnance on theory of mind tasks was equivalent to the
ditference tbund between the groups on a rule use task. Zelazo eta!. used a
rule-use task as an alternative cognitive functioning test to detennine whether
or not theory of mind functions were domain-specific. The present study used
the RCPM as a test of cognitive functioning and found it correlated
significantly with theory of mind pertbnnance of children with intellectual
disabilities, and that any differences between groups could be explained by the
child's level of cognitive functioning.
Klin, Volkmar and Sparrow (1992) tested the specificity hypothesis
made by some researchers by comparing the participants' scores on a
socialisation and motor skills test. The researchers found that the children
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with intellectual disabilities displayed early social and motor skills at a level
that would be expected, given their developmental delay. The researchers
stated that as there was no evidence of a greater deficit in one particular area
of social skill attainment, that specificity (or a domain-specific function) could
not be supported by their study. Where Klin et al. ( 1992) used social cognition
to test for specificity, the present study has used general cognitive functioning
in the form of the RCPM, which tests problem solving and spatial abilities,
rather than other social abilities.
These findings indicate that theory of mind development in children
with intellectual disabilities is consistent with their development in other areas
of cognition.
In contrast to these findings, other researchers (Charman & BaronCohen, 1992; Leslie, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1991) have found evidence for the
domain-specificity oftheory of mind functions in children with intellectual
disabilities. All of these studies, however, have used a different measure, other
than general cognitive functioning, with which to draw their conclusions. For
example, Charman and Baron-Cohen used a comparison between false belief
tests and false drawing tests to obtain their results, Leslie used a picturesequencing task to compare with theol)' of mind performance, and BaronCohen used tests of relationship recognition, simple reciprocity and
understanding of animate-inanimate distinction to compare with theol)' of
mind performance. These measures do test other cognitive functions, but do
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not specifically test general cognitive functioning. In addition to different tests
used to determine specificity, the children with intellectual disabilities
participating in these studies were a lot older than the children of average
intelligence matched for mental age. This may have had some bearing on the
results of these studies.
In the present study, when correlations between the students' total
theory of mind scores and the RCPM scores were calculated, the overall
correlation showed that general cognitive functioning was a significant factor
in theory of mind performance. However, when correlations were performed
for the individual groups, only the ES group showed that general cognitive
functioning was a significant factor in theory of mind performance. The other
two groups displayed non-significant correlations between these factors. A
possible explanation for the CA groups' non-significant finding was their
restricted range of RCPM scores. However, this is not the case for the MA
group. It is difficult to account for the non-significant finding for this group.
However, as far as the children with intellectual disabilities are
concerned, the present study shows that any delays in theory of mind can be
adequately accounted for by more general functions such as their verbal mental
age and general cognitive functioning.
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Cognitive Functions Used During Testing
Given that performance on theory of mind tasks by children with
intellectual disabilities appears not to be a separate function, but related to
general cognitive functioning, the question arises as to what general cognitive
functions are used during the completion of such tasks. When performing
theory of mind tasks, children with intellectual disabilities use a number of
different cognitive functions. Some of the more obvious of these are language
(verbal ability) and memory. Memory will be discussed further in the
following section.
In order to understand the tasks and what is required of them, the
children with intellectual disabilities need to draw on their linguistic ability.
They must be able to understand the structure of the sentences (syntax), the
meaning behind the words (semantics) and the purpose of the language
(pragmatics). These skills are required to interpret the scenarios that are
presented to them, understand the questions asked, interpret what is required
of them in terms of an answer, and have the ability to communicate a response
back to the researcher. Language ability in the present study was controlled
for by matching the students on verbal mental age using the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary test.
Some of the children with intellectual disabilities appeared to find these
linguistic demands too heavy, and tried to make use of other aspects of the
context by looking at the researcher tbr non-verbal cues before answering any
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questions. Two students also held their hands in a hovering position over a
particular choice for their answer and attempted to make eye contact with the
researcher, as ifto check that their answers would be correct. The researcher
remained passive and straight-faced throughout the sessions in order to ensure
that no non-verbal cues were given.
It was also noticed that a larger number of children with intellectual

disabilities took a longer amount oftime to answer questions put to them than
children in the other groups. They exhibited a number of reasoning or
"thinking" poses, such as holding their faces between their hands, sucking on a
linger, and screwing up their faces in concentration. Although no actual
timing of the children's responses was conducted in this study, it would be
interesting for future research to see if this has any relation to the children's
performance on theory of mind tasks.
The theory of mind tasks also appear to place demands on children's
sense of spatial orientation. They demonstrated this by using their hands to go
through the scenario again, and also by moving their heads from side to side,
as if they were putting themselves in the doll's position. It was as if they were
attempting to take the >patial orientation of the doll in order to answer the
question.
These are some of the cognitive functions that may be used by children
with intellectual disabilities when they are completing theory of mind tasks.
Therefore both the statistical analyses in the present study, as well as the
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anecdotal observations made during testing suggest that theory of mind tasks
demand a number of different cognitive functions working together to give
children insight into others' beliefs and desires, and to enable them to predict
behaviour of others from this knowledge.

Memory
The third research question deals with whether or not memory can
account for any differences on theory of mind performance. All of the
participants were asked memory check questions throughout the tasks. All of
these questions were answered with 100% accuracy by all groups. Therefore
memory was found not to be a significant factor in the theory of mind
performance.
The memory questions that were used throughout the study demanded
recall of one piece of information at a time, whereas the theory of mind task
demands simultaneous processing of several pieces. It is therefore possible
that the memory tasks did not account for all possible memory demands.
Davis and Pratt (1995) conducted a study using forward digit span and
backward digit span to determine if a memory task would predict theory of
mind perfonnance. Forward digit span tests articulatory loop capacity, which
is responsible for short-term storage of verbal and spatial infonnation.
Backward digit span tests central executive capacity, which is responsible for
active processing, such as encoding, retrieving and manipulating information.
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Davis and Pratt found that backward digit span predicted theory of mind
perfonnance, but forward digit span did not. They found that backward digit
span was a better indicator of theory of mind task perfonnance than age and
verbal skills. This would indicate that backward digit span should be used in
future research to further investigate the role of memory in theory of mind task
perfonnance.
Perfonnance on theory of mind tasks doesn't appear to depend on
articulatory loop capacity as measured by simple recall of infonnation but does
appear to depend on the ability of the central executive function to retrieve and
manipulate infonnation.

Limitations and Suggestions for Further Rt'searclt
The tasks that were used in this study were all standard theory of mind
tasks. However, the children were asked only one second-order false belief
question in the study. This is a concern, as it may not have allowed for the
children, particularly those in theCA group, to show true perfonnance on
these types of questions. The older children of average intelligence reached
ceiling, so a more difficult theory of mind task would be appropriate for these
children.
In addition, it is possible for children to guess the correct answers
without really understanding second-order theory of mind. For first order
questions there was a 50% chance of obtaining a correct answer by guessing,
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and for the second-order questions there was a 33% chance of obtaining the
correct answer by guessing. Inclusion of one or more extra second-order
theory of mind tasks would have allowed for chance events to be better
controlled. This was also a concern of Benson, Abbeduto, Short, Nuccio and
Maas (1993 ).
In addition, another dependent variable could have included the time
taken to respond to the theory of mind questions. It was noted in this study
that the children with intellectual disabilities appeared to take longer than the
other groups to answer these questions. Maybe a more sensitive measure than
the number of questions correctly answered could have been used to determine
theory of mind performance.
Backward digit span memory checks could also have been added to the
study to test for executive control function, which would have tested the
children's ability to encode, retrieve and manipulate information, rather than
testing for straight recall offacts.
Using groups of different cognitive abilities for comparison would be
useful for further research. The children with intellectual disabilities tested in
this study were in the mild to moderate category of intellectual disability, and
the children without intellectual disabilities were of average intelligence. By
using groups of mild, moderate and severe intellectual disability, and children
of low-average intelligence, a broader comparison of theory of mind
functioning could have been achieved.
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Implications for Education
The main implication of this study for education is that the children
with intellectual disabilities do not appear to have a specific deficit in theory of
mind performance. This is an encouraging result because teachers can teach
skills in the social domain to children with intellectual disabilities with the
confidence that these children do not have a particular deficit in their ability to
see things from another's point of view. If children with intellectual
disabilities have difficulty learning social skills, it is most likely due to their
cognitive ability and level of adaptive skills.
Swettenham (1996) attempted to teach theory of mind skills to children
with Down Syndrome. The study was conducted using a group of children
with Down Syndrome, with a mean age of II ;9, matched on verbal mental age
with a group of children of average intelligence, with a mean age of 3;5. All of
these children had previously failed theory of mind tasks. Using computer
technology, the children were taught basic theory of mind scenarios. At a 3month follow-up, all of the children were successful at completing theory of
mind tasks, which differed in scenario from the originally taught tasks. As
these children were close to the age at which theory of mind is supposed to
exhibit itself, it is possible that they would have begun to understand this
concept on their own without any training in the near future. The fact that the
children had no difficulty with theory of mind concepts at a 3-month follow-up
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however suggests that, once obtained, this concept is maintained by these
children.

Summary
In summary, there is no evidence that children with intellectual
disabilities have a deficit in theory of mind in the way that children with
autism have. This study also does not support the specificity hypothesis made
in relation to theory of mind that theory of mind functions are domain-specific
and separate to other cognitive functions.
There is a need, however, for more research in this area, particularly in
relation to children of different cognitive levels. There also needs to be greater
investigation of the reasons for the deficit being found in certain groups, while
not being found in others. By studying the causes of the deficits in these areas,
researchers may be able to extend their knowledge base on theory of mind and
its origins. This would in tum enable educators to better plan for the needs of
their students, by being aware offactors which may affect their social learning.
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Appendix A
Consent Letter for Parents

Dear Parent or Guardian,
lam conducting research to find out whether children can see different people's
points of view. This is an important skill, both at school and in the community. lf
teachers are able to understand the child's ability to adopt another person's
perspective, they will be able to teach them life skills which are relevant to their
needs, now and in the future.
I am writing to ask for your consent to include your child in this research. If you
agree, your child will be taken out of the classroom for one 30-35 minute session to
a quiet room in the school, and given several tasks to complete. Children generally
enjoy these sessions and treat them as games. Your child will be asked to talk about
what he or she is doing and his/her comments will be audio taped. Nobody other
than the researcher will listen to the tapes. No names will be reported.
If you have any questions about this research please phone Dianne Campbell on
ph: 9123 4567. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Yours faithfully,

Dianne Campbell
Honours Student- Faculty of Education
Edith Cowan University

I have read the information above and any questions I asked have been answered to
my satisfaction. I consent to my child- ---c~----,o------
participating in the research, realising 1 may withdraw at any time.

Name

Signature
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Appendix B
Script for Perspective Task

Experimenter: "Here I have a teddy bear and an elephant. Between them
are four blocks. Can the teddy see all of the blocks?"
Child: (replies)
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see all of the blocks?"
Child: (replies)
(Place a screen to separate two of the blocks.)
Experimenter: "Can the teddy see the blue block?" (Point to the blue block.)
Child: (replies)
Experimenter: "Can the teddy see the red block?" (Point to the red block.)
Child: (replies)
Experimenter: "Can the teddy see the green block?" (Point to the green block.)
Child: (replies)
Experimenter: "Can the teddy see the yellow block?" (Point to the yellow
block.)
Child: (replies)
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see the blue block?" (Point to the blue
block.)
Child: (replies)
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see the red block?" (Point to the red block.)
Child: (replies)
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see the green block?" (Point to the green
block.)
Child: (replies)
Experimenter: "Can the elephant see the yellow block?" (Point to the yellow
block.)
Child: (replies)
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Appendix C
Script for Smarties Task

(Show the child a smarties container.)

Experimenter:

"What do you think is in here?"

Child: (replies)

(Show the child what is inside the tube.)

Experimenter:

"When I first showed you this tube what did you think

was in here"

Child: (replies)

Experimenter:

"lf(name of classmate) comes in who hasn't seen inside

the tube, what will he/,he think is inside here?"

Child: (replies)

Experimenter:

"What was really in the tube?"

Child: (replies)

80

Appendix D
Script for Sally Anne False Belief Task

Experimenter: "This is Sally and this is Anne. Sally has a basket in front of
her and Anne has a box in front of her" (Demonstrate this scenario.)
"Sally has a marble which she puts in her basket. Then she leaves the
room. Anne moves the marble from the basket to her box. Sally then
comes back into the room. Where will Sally look for her marble?"

Child: (replies)

Experimenter:

"Where is the marble really?"

Child: (replies)

Experimenter:

"Where was the marble at the beginning?"

Child: (replies)
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Appendix E
Script for Sally/Anne/Ben False Belief Task

Experimenter:

"Sally and Anne are now joined by a friend of theirs

named Ben. In front of Ben there is a bucket. Sally places her marble
into her basket and leaves the room. Anne then moves the marble from
Sally's basket and puts it into her box. She also leaves the room. Ben
then moves the marble from Anne's box and puts it into his bucket.
Sally comes back into the room. Where will Sally look for her marble?"

Child: (replies)

Experimenter:

"Anne comes back into the room. Where will Anne look

for the marble?"

Child: (replies)

Experimenter:

"Where would Anne think that Sally would look for the

marble?"

Child: (replies)

Experimenter:

"Where did Sally put the marble?"

Child: (replies)

Experimenter:

"Where did Ben put the marble?"

Child: (replies)
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